The classification of psychopathology appears to be at a crossroads, with a new version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders impending and one of the current aspirations of the National Institute of Mental Health being the development of new ways of classifying mental disorders. This article discusses what we currently know about psychopathology and the role that classification has played in psychopathology research. It is pointed out that a wide variety of etiological factors, both within and outside the individual, have been implicated in the etiology of psychopathology, and that there is no empirical or conceptual reason to privilege any particular level of explanation. The ways in which signs/symptoms and disorders may be related are discussed, including their implications for classification. The value of theory development and theory-driven research is emphasized, along with the potential perils of generating an ossified classification scheme that must be adhered to.
According to Blashfield and Draguns (1976) , two of the most important purposes of classification are to describe the objects of study in a science and to serve as a source of concepts to be used within a scientific theory. Thus, the classification of psychopathology is intricately intertwined with psychopathology research. The manner in which psychopathology is classified will necessarily reflect our understanding of psychopathology and has the potential to both facilitate and impede further progress. Because the classification of psychopathology appears to be at a crossroads, with the impending release of a new version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and with the National Institute of Mental Health beginning to take a more active role in classification development (at least for research purposes), the goal of this article is to use what we currently know about psychopathology and the role that classification has historically played in psychopathology research as a springboard to discuss the future role of classification and, indeed, the future of psychopathology research.
What Contributes to Psychopathology?
As pointed out by Kendler (2008) , there is abundant evidence that the pathways to psychopathology "involve causal processes that act both at micro levels and macro levels, that act within and outside of the individual, and that involve processes best understood from biological, psychological, and sociocultural perspectives" (p. 695). For example, there is rapidly accumulating evidence that genes play a role in the etiology of substance use disorders (even if no single gene plays a large role; e.g., Derringer et al., 2012) , that perturbations of neural circuitry are associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Del Casale et al., 2011) , that culture is important for understanding eating disorders (e.g., Keel & Klump, 2003) , that peer influences are important for understanding externalizing psychopathology (e.g., Laursen, Hafen, Kerr, & Stattin, 2012) , and that population density and migration are associated with schizophrenia (e.g., Bourque, van der Ven, & Malla, 2011; Kelly et al., 2010) .
Just because numerous factors contribute to psychopathology does not, of course, mean that they are all important. One criterion that can be used to judge the relative importance of different etiological factors is the strength of their contributions.
1 Although the strength of narrowly defined etiological factors (e.g., specific genes, specific cultural values) is likely to vary, and some may be small, there is already strong evidence that broader classes of etiological factors (e.g., genetic, neural, cognitive, interpersonal, sociocultural) all appear to account for at least modest proportions of variance. The importance of these factors has also been demonstrated in relation to interventions for psychopathology. Whereas genetics has not yet played a role in efficacious treatments, other broad factors clearly have. For example, our understanding of neurotransmission and neural circuits is the key to all psychopharmacological interventions, remediation of cognitive deficits and biases reduces symptoms and improves functioning among individuals with a range of psychopathology (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; Wykes, Huddy, Cellard, McGurk, & Czobor, 2011) , targeting of interpersonal factors is central to efficacious interventions for numerous psychological problems (e.g., Jakobsen, Hansen, Simonsen, Simonsen, & Gluud, 2012; Markowitz & Weissman, 2012) , the role of cultural standards of thinness is central to a preventive intervention for eating disorders that has been found to be both efficacious and effective (e.g., Stice, Rohde, Durant, & Shaw, 2012; Stice, Rohde, Gau, & Shaw, 2009; Stice, Rohde, Shaw, & Gau, 2011) , and sociocultural factors need to be taken into account in the provision of all psychosocial interventions (e.g., Barrera & Castro, 2006; Hwang, 2011; Lau, 2006) . Furthermore, there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to expect that the contribution of any one broad etiological factor (e.g., environment) will depend on other broad etiological factors (e.g., genes; Karg, Burmeister, Shedden, & Sen, 2011; Kendler et al., 2012) .
Even if the strength of etiological factors' contributions is all important, is there any conceptual or logical basis on which to argue that one type of contribution is more important than others? For example, can one reasonably argue that neurological phenomena "underlie" psychopathology or that the genetic factors that contribute to psychopathology are somehow more "fundamental" than social factors? As thoughtfully articulated by G. A. Miller and Keller (2000) , it is not a property of biological data that they "underlie" psychological data. A given theory may explicitly propose such a relationship, but it must be treated as a proposal, not as a fact about the data. Biological data provide valuable information that may not be obtainable with self-report or overt behavioral measures, but biological information is not inherently more fundamental, more accurate, more representative, or even more objective. (p. 213)
How Should Psychopathology Be Conceptualized and Organized?
That some individuals have beliefs that bear no relation to reality, or have debilitating fears that prevent them from leaving their homes, or experience distress so great that they seriously consider taking their own lives (and, tragically, sometimes do) is indisputable. What continues to be debated, however, is how to conceptualize these phenomena, which are generally lumped together using terms such as psychopathology and mental disorders. A good deal of attention has been devoted to the unanswered question of how to define psychopathology at the broadest level (i.e., what should be considered mental disorder and what should not); such issues are important and have been discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Lilienfeld & Marino, 1995; Wakefield, 1992; Widiger, 1997) . What I wish to focus on, however, is the question of how to conceptualize and classify those thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (such as delusions, phobias, and suicidality) that most people would agree are undesirable and evidence of something having gone terribly wrong.
The signs and symptoms of psychopathology do not appear to be randomly distributed across the population. Specifically, individuals who have a given sign or symptom (e.g., delusions) tend to be more likely than expected (based on base rates alone) to have other signs and symptoms (e.g., hallucinations). In other words, certain sets of signs and symptoms tend to cluster together. In the field of physical medicine, when signs and symptoms tend to cluster together and are presumed to have a common etiology, they are referred to as a syndrome. Historically, the field of mental health has tended to follow in the footsteps of physical medicine and to propose the existence of disorders that can account for the covariation of signs and symptoms.
The perspective that has been adopted (wittingly or unwittingly) by the vast majority of psychopathology researchers is that disorders represent latent entities that are distinct from, yet can account for, the covarying sets of signs and symptoms. Thus, mental disorders (regardless of whether they are thought to be categorical or dimensional) can be thought of as hypothetical constructs (e.g., Kozak & Miller, 1982; Morey, 1991; Neale & Oltmanns, 1980; Skinner, 1981) . Hypothetical constructs are explanatory variables that, according to MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) , "involve terms which are not wholly reducible to empirical terms" and "refer to processes or entities that are not directly observed" (p. 104).
Given that hypothetical constructs necessarily carry surplus meaning, it is incumbent on researchers to engage in the process of construct validation. First and foremost, validating a hypothetical construct requires having a theory regarding the construct. The theory should then guide evaluation of the nomological network, which enumerates the laws relating theoretical constructs to each other, observables to each other, and theoretical constructs to observables. As stated by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) , "'Learning more about' a theoretical construct is a matter of elaborating the nomological network in which it occurs" (p. 290). Thus, research on mental disorders, which are hypothetical constructs, ought to be theory-driven and aimed at elaborating nomological networks.
Theories of psychopathology need to account for the relations among signs and symptoms. Most existing classification systems (e.g., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [4th ed.] ; DSM-IV) imply that there are sets of mutually exclusive latent disorders, each of which is manifested in a variety of signs and symptoms. For example, in the DSM-IV, major depressive disorder is presumed to be (a) manifested in (at least a subset of) the nine signs and symptoms listed as diagnostic criteria (e.g., fatigue or loss of energy); and (b) independent of posttraumatic stress disorder (which is itself presumed to be manifested in [at least a subset of] the 17 signs and symptoms listed as diagnostic criteria). However, there is a wide variety of reasons why signs and symptoms may covary other than their all being manifestations of independent latent disorders. Four of these reasons are illustrated in generic psychopathology models illustrated in Figures 2-5, each of which differs from the generic psychopathology model illustrated in Figure 1 (in which there are two latent disorders, with one manifested in Symptoms 1-5, and the other manifested in Symptoms 6 -10); each model in Figures 1-5 attempts to explain a common set of 10 symptoms (labeled S1-S10) associated with two latent disorders (labeled X and Y). First, latent disorders can themselves be influenced by other latent entities; such a possibility is illustrated in Figure 2 , in which a latent factor W contributes to two latent disorders (X and Y). In fact, there is already evidence suggesting that such models fit the data better than do models in which the different latent disorders are considered to be independent of one another (e.g., Krueger & Markon, 2006) . This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Second, even if a symptom is a manifestation of an underlying latent disorder, such manifest symptoms can themselves contribute further to symptoms that are largely reflections of underlying latent disorders; such a possibility is illustrated in Figure 3 , in which S4 contributes to S5 (with S5 also being a manifestation of latent disorder X). Third, some symptoms may not be reflections of underlying latent disorders but instead can be caused by symptoms that are themselves reflections of underlying latent disorders (see Borsboom, 2008, and Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas, & Borsboom, 2010 , for discussions of symptoms contributing to other symptoms); such a possibility is illustrated in Figure 4 , in which S4 contributes to S5 (although, unlike the model in Figure  3 , S5 is not a manifestation of latent disorder X). Finally, a fourth possibility is that some signs and symptoms are not in fact reflections of underlying latent disorders but instead potentiate the development of the latent disorder (see Berenbaum, Oltmanns, & Gottesman, 1990 , for an empirical illustration of such a possibility); the possibility of symptoms potentiating the development of a latent disorder is illustrated in Figure 5 , in which S1 is a potentiator of latent disorder X.
It is important for researchers to develop models of psychopathology, but it is equally important to actually test them. For example, data regarding the covariation of different symptoms, longitudinal data, and research designs that include examination of latent or directly observable hypothesized etiological factors (such as genetically informed designs) could and should be used to compare the fit of alternative models (e.g., Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008; Kendler, Prescott, Myers, & Neale, 2003; Jackson, Sher, & Schulenberg, 2005) .
Classification, the DSM, and Psychopathology Research
Most contemporary psychopathology research revolves around mental disorders as defined and operationalized by the DSM. For example, articles published in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology are organized in terms of classes of mental disorders (e.g., anxiety and mood disorders, schizophrenia and schizophrenia spectrum disorders, personality disorders, substance use disorders), with a very small minority appearing under the label transdiagnostic. Of the approximately 100 articles appearing in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology in 2012, the large majority (approximately 75%) either examined or used as inclusion criteria mental disorders listed in the DSM-IV; when excluding those articles in which the participants were drawn from nonclinical samples (e.g., studies of relatively unselected groups of community members or college students), the percentage of articles that examined or used as inclusion criteria mental disorders listed in the DSM-IV rose to 86%. Notably, only three articles explored alternative systems for classifying mental disorders: Crow et al. (2012) did so using latent Generic psychopathology model illustrating a symptom (S1) that is a potentiator of a latent disorder rather than being a manifestation of a latent disorder. X and Y ϭ latent disorders; S ϭ symptom. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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class analysis to analyze eating disorder symptom data from a large group of individuals that had been treated for eating disorders, and two studies (Eaton et al., 2012; Lahey et al., 2012) explored broad dimensional approaches to psychopathology, but did so using categorical DSM-IV diagnosis data. Thus, not a single article used data not based on the DSM-IV to explore a theorydriven alternative to the DSM.
As noted earlier, one of the purposes of classification is to serve as a source of concepts to be used within a scientific theory. Clearly, given that the large majority of psychopathology research revolves around DSM-based disorders, the DSM has served as a source of concepts. At the same time, the paucity of research on alternative concepts is astounding. Even if one were to think that the most recent DSM has done a perfect job carving the psychopathology pie into disorders, is there good reason to think that all of the inclusion and exclusion criteria for each of the disorders are optimal? That psychopathology researchers continue to focus on DSM-based disorders is all the more remarkable given that there is growing recognition that the traditional diagnostic categories included in the DSM have serious limitations (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). For example, Insel et al. (2010) pointed out that "diagnostic categories based on clinical consensus fail to align with findings emerging from clinical neuroscience and genetics" (p. 748).
That the large majority of psychopathology research revolves around DSM-based disorders is in stark contrast to the advice of Feyerabend (1970) :
Do not work with stable concepts. Do not eliminate counterinduction. Do not be seduced into thinking that you have at last found the correct description of "the facts" when all that has happened is that some new categories have been adapted to some older forms of thought. (p. 36) If, as Feyerabend points out, all scientific laws are eventually found to be wanting, why should a single set of disorders, even if agreed on by a group of experts at a single moment in time, be the almost exclusive focus of study by psychopathology researchers for a period of almost 20 years?
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project
In response to concerns that research focusing on conventional (e.g., DSM-IV) diagnostic categories has been impeding rather than promoting progress, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has embarked on something it calls the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, intended to "create a framework for research on pathophysiology, especially for genomics and neuroscience, which ultimately will inform future classification schemes" (Insel et al., 2010, p. 748) . RDoC is a means of implementing NIMH's strategic plan Strategy 1.4, which is to "develop, for research purposes, new ways of classifying mental disorders." As described by Morris and Cuthbert (2012) , "In the near term, efforts under the RDoC initiative will focus on identifying broad domains of functioning and their constituent dimensional constructs, developing reliable and valid measures across a range of units of analysis for each construct" (p. 30). As stated by Sanislow et al. (2010) , "research using the RDoC approach will be organized on the basis of the putative mechanisms rather than the conventional diagnostic categories" (p. 634).
According to Insel et al. (2010) , "the RDoC framework conceptualizes mental illnesses as brain disorders. In contrast to neurological disorders with identifiable lesions, mental disorders can be addressed as disorders of brain circuits" (p. 749). In other words, as stated by Sanislow et al. (2010) , "ultimately, the fundamental psychopathology [emphasis added] is likely to be disrupted neural circuits" (p. 637). Underlying the RDoC framework, then, is the assumption that biological phenomena are somehow more fundamental than psychological phenomena.
It should be pointed out that RDoC does not focus exclusively on biology. As pointed out by Sanislow et al. (2010) , a "focus on 'lower' level mechanisms does not necessitate that 'higher' level constructs be dismissed" (p. 633). However, ultimately, "the RDoC framework emphasizes the integration of knowledge about genes, cells, and neural circuits with knowledge about cognition, emotion, and behavior" (Sanislow et al., 2010, p. 634) . The emphasis on genes, cells, and neural circuits follows from the core assumption that mental disorders are brain disorders. Given the assumption that mental disorders are brain disorders and that the "fundamental" core of psychopathology is deviant neural circuitry, it should come as no surprise that, according to Insel et al. (2010) , "in the near-term, RDoC may be most useful for researchers mapping brain-behavior relationships as well as genomic discoveries in human and nonhuman animal studies" (p. 749).
According to the June 2011 Draft 3.1 of RDoC (http:// www.nimh.nih.gov/research-funding/rdoc/nimh-research-domaincriteria-rdoc.shtml), the three criteria that guided the initial selection of potential RDoC domains/dimensions were (a) "whether a particular brain circuit or area could reasonably be specified that implements that dimension"; (b) an attempt to "maintain a reasonable 'grain size' that would permit a tractable listing of the major functional dimensions of behavior"; and (c) "current literatures that have provided a neurobehavioral research base for each of the entries." Thus, the two substantive selection criteria focus on neural circuits and neurobehavioral research.
The range of factors unlikely to be pursued under RDoC is not limited to those that might be thought of as residing outside the individual. Because RDoC focuses on neural circuits seen throughout phylogeny, it is likely to neglect quintessentially human phenomena that are remarkably important for understanding humans (including the development of psychopathology and its potential treatment). Two related examples of human experience that cannot be observed or studied in nonhumans are beliefs and spirituality. One cannot study in rats the belief that one is worthless or that a divine entity created and watches over you. There already exists abundant evidence that beliefs and spirituality are important for understanding psychopathology (e.g., L. Miller et al., 2012; Riso, du Toit, Stein, & Young, 2007) . Furthermore, beliefs may well be important for psychosocial treatments of psychopathology. In fact, cognitive therapy, which focuses on altering beliefs, has about as strong a track record of treating depression as any other intervention (e.g., Hollon & Ponniah, 2010 ) and also appears to be a potentially valuable tool for treating psychosis (e.g., Lincoln et al., 2012) . Finally, it should be noted that although beliefs associated with psychopathology may well covary with functional activity of certain neural circuits, it is highly unlikely that (a) there will be neural circuits that contribute directly and specifically to such beliefs or (b) the optimal strategy for understanding beliefs and their relevance to the etiology and treatment of psychopathology is This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
to focus on neural circuits. Just as it would be foolish to think that the optimal path to developing novel psychotropic medications is to first focus on understanding the precise nature of belief formation and modification, it would be equally foolish to think that the optimal path to developing novel psychosocial interventions is to first focus on the genetics and neural circuitry associated with psychopathology. This is not to say that an understanding of beliefs will not be helpful to the development of psychopharmacological interventions, or that an understanding of genetics and neural circuitry will not be helpful to the development and delivery of psychosocial interventions-I believe they will-however, there is no good theoretical or empirical reason to privilege one level of exploration over the other.
Classification, RDoC, and the Future of Psychopathology Research
A critical issue that psychopathology researchers will need to grapple with is which level (or levels) of explanation should be included in their conceptualizations of, and means of classifying, psychopathology. For example, RDoC assumes that mental disorders ought to be conceptualized as disorders of brain circuits, which led to the recommendation that researchers integrate knowledge about genes, cells, and neural circuits with knowledge about cognition, emotion, and behavior. The assumption that mental disorders are disorders of brain circuits could easily be replaced by any number of similarly narrow assumptions. For example, one can imagine an alternative conceptualization of psychopathology focusing on interpersonal relationships and social context that led to exhortations to integrate knowledge about dyads, families, and communities with knowledge about cognition, emotion, and behavior. As this example illustrates, to the degree that a priori assumptions are made regarding the nature of psychopathology, they will influence the kinds of questions asked and research conducted.
Although a brain and neural circuits are needed for complex behaviors, it does not follow that the best way to understand all complex behaviors is by reducing them to the level of neural circuits. As pointed out by G. A. Miller (2010) , "we should not confuse psychological and biological events" (p. 718). The problem with asserting that neural circuits are "fundamental" and that mental disorders "can be addressed as disorders of brain circuits" is captured in the following example provided by Kosslyn and Koenig (1992 
The aim is not to replace a description of mental events by a description of brain activity. That would be like replacing a description of architecture with a description of building materials. Although the nature of the materials restricts the kinds of buildings that can be built, it does not characterize their function or design. (p. 4) The results of research to date do not support the notion that any one level of explanation can largely account for psychopathology. As stated by Turkheimer (1998) , "complex human behaviors of the kind that have interested psychologists-beliefs, intentions, emotions, personalities-do not have localized biological or genetic causes in the sense that stroke lesions cause aphasia or a single gene causes phenylketonuria" (p. 789). Given what we currently know about psychopathology, there is no sound conceptual or empirical basis to privilege any particular level of explanation.
With time, some levels may prove to be more useful, at least for some purposes, than others. For example, a focus on neural circuits may prove to be more useful for the development of novel psychopharmacological agents, whereas a focus on interpersonal or cognitive explanations may prove to be more useful for the development of psychotherapeutic interventions (although we should remain mindful that psychopharmacological interventions influence outcomes such as cognitions, and psychotherapeutic interventions influence brain functioning; e.g., Baxter et al., 1992) . To the degree that intervention development is influenced by "basic" research (e.g., Borkovec, 1997) , a downstream consequence of focusing primarily, let alone exclusively, on any one level of explanation would be to constrain the development of future interventions, which would, in turn, limit our ability to reduce the prevalence and burden of psychopathology.
With encouragement from NIMH and the RDoC project, an increasing number of psychopathology researchers are likely to devote diminishing attention to DSM categories. The RDoC project encourages researchers to turn their attention from disorders to "mechanisms." Instead of contrasting research on disorders with research on mechanisms, a potentially more valuable distinction is between research on hypothetical constructs and research on intervening variables (see Miller, 1982, and Morey, 1991 , respectively, for discussions of how the concepts of hypothetical constructs and intervening variables can be applied to the conceptualization and assessment of clinical phenomena and to the classification of psychopathology). To provide a more concrete example, instead of conducting research on schizophrenia (as an intervening variable, operationalized by the DSM), researchers can be testing theories of schizophrenia (e.g., theories/conceptualizations of schizophrenia of the sort proposed by Meehl, 1962 Meehl, , 1990 and the mechanisms proposed therein. One of my own articles (Berenbaum, 1992) , which compared the facial behavior of groups of individuals with DSM diagnoses of schizophrenia and major depressive disorder, provides an illustration of work that focused on intervening variables but failed to discuss hypothetical constructs. This article referred to the intervening variable (i.e., the DSM diagnostic categories) but did not refer to or describe any mental disorder constructs (e.g., a theory/conceptualization of schizophrenia). Although the research may have been influenced by a theory of schizophrenia, my article did not indicate whether this was the case. Similarly, although the research could have been used to inform/evaluate mental disorder constructs (e.g., theories/ conceptualizations of schizophrenia), the article itself did not do so. The article, in fact, resembles thousands of other articles published in psychopathology journals over the past several decades. Such articles compare individuals categorized with a wide variety of disorders, as defined by the DSM, employ careful diagnostic practices, and meticulously measure variables of interest (whether they be movements of facial muscles, allelic variations, or indicators of metabolic activity in a particular brain region), but do not describe the relevance of the findings to mental disorder constructs (e.g., theories/conceptualizations of schizophrenia). The distinction I am attempting to draw is that between (a) examining the correlates of an operationally defined mental disorder that is not itself rooted in theory and (b) testing (at least a part of) a broad, comprehensive theory of a hypothetical construct. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
In addition to proposing and testing broad, comprehensive theories of mental disorders, it will also be useful for researchers to develop theories of individual signs and symptoms, such as affective flattening and delusions, and to conduct research on mechanisms proposed in such theories. Such theories of signs and symptoms may be embedded within broader theories of mental disorders, although they need not be. But, once they have been developed and tested, they can be used to develop or modify broader theories of mental disorders. Thus, in my view, what the field actually needs now are theories regarding (a) individual signs and symptoms and (b) mental disorders. We also need more serious theoretical work on (a) how particular factors can contribute to multiple signs, symptoms, and disorders (see Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012 , for an example) and (b) the relations between disorders and signs/symptoms (i.e., developing specific alternative models such as those illustrated in generic fashion in Figures 1-5) . The selection of mechanisms on which to conduct research should be driven by such theories, and the results of such theory-informed research on mechanisms should feed back into new and revised theories; in other words, there should be an ongoing feedback mechanism between theories and research.
In focusing almost exclusively on the DSM, researchers over the past few decades have too often failed to explore alternative conceptualizations (and accompanying definitions) of mental disorders. For example, psychopathology can be conceptualized and measured either much more broadly or much more narrowly than the disorders in the DSM, and they can be conceptualized and measured dimensionally or categorically. Psychopathology researchers can propose and conduct research on a wide variety of complementary and competing psychopathological entities (hypothetical constructs). Examples of alternatives that have been proposed are endogenomorphic/melancholic depression (e.g., Klein, 1974) , hopelessness depression (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) , and the internalizing spectrum (e.g., Krueger & Markon, 2011) , all of which could be compared with each other and with alternatives such as major depressive disorder. The idea of comparing and contrasting competing definitions of mental disorders is hardly new (e.g., McGuffin, Farmer, Gottesman, Murray, & Reveley, 1984) , but rarely implemented.
Barring unnecessary constraints (e.g., what funding agencies are willing to support), those constructs and classification systems that appear to be most useful will continue to be studied, whereas those that are less useful will fall by the wayside. One of the purposes of classification is to help make predictions (e.g., Blashfield & Draguns, 1976) , and so the utilities of different constructs (as well as different approaches to understanding psychopathology and the resulting classification systems that reflect their understandings) are likely to be judged by their abilities to make predictions, especially predictions concerning differential responses to prevention and treatment approaches. It is quite possible that different ways of classifying mental disorders will turn out to be differentially successful at predicting alternative outcomes. For example, a classification system that divides psychopathology into broader categories or dimensions may prove to be more useful for making predictions regarding prevention than will a classification system that divides psychopathology into narrower categories or dimensions, whereas a classification system that divides psychopathology into narrower categories or dimensions may prove to be more useful for making predictions regarding treatment than will a classification system that divides psychopathology into broader categories or dimensions. Consequently, psychopathology researchers should not necessarily be trying to identify a single best classification system, but should instead be open to the possibility of alternative systems being less or more useful for different purposes.
The DSM has defined mental disorders on the basis of presenting signs and symptoms. Because mental disorders are hypothetical constructs, and hypothetical constructs of mental disorders essentially describe the nature and causes of a set of mental health outcomes, there is no scientific reason why mental disorders need to be defined solely on the basis of signs and symptoms. In other words, theories of mental disorders, and their accompanying operationalizations, can include anything included in theory. In fact, some theories will distinguish between individuals considered to have different mental disorders despite exhibiting remarkably similar signs and symptoms, such as Meehl's (1990) distinction between schizophrenia and SHAITU (submissive, hypohedonic, anxious, introverted, traumatized, and unlucky) syndrome. It would be perfectly reasonable, therefore, to operationalize a given disorder/ hypothetical construct on the basis not only of signs/symptoms, but also on the basis of factors such as age of onset, the presence/ absence of psychosocial stressors, and levels of connectivity between brain regions while performing a particular task. The reason for this is that, as pointed out by Hempel (1965) , "in a classificatory system with a theoretical basis, two individuals with similar symptoms may then come to be assigned to quite different classes" (p. 149).
The RDoC project is in the midst of specifying a set of domains (e.g., negative valence systems, cognitive systems) and dimensions (e.g., attention, perception, working memory, declarative memory, language behavior, and cognitive control). The domains/dimensions to be included in RDoC, the specific means of parsing them, and the recommended means of measuring them will necessarily be somewhat arbitrary no matter how much effort NIMH devotes to obtaining input from researchers. Furthermore, to the degree that the decisions are informed by research already conducted, one should expect them to be outdated sooner rather than later, and almost certainly sooner than they will be revised. Moreover, because the selection of domains/dimensions to be studied should be driven by theories of mental disorders, signs/symptoms, and the relations between disorders and sign/symptoms, and because such theories should be constantly evolving in response to new research and new ideas, the domains/dimensions selected for study should be constantly evolving. There is nothing wrong with NIMH proposing a set of domains/dimensions as a starting point or for the purpose of illustration, but if RDoC becomes rigidly prescriptive, with funded research restricted to examining RDoC domains/ dimensions and discouraged from exploring alternative domains/ dimensions, RDoC is ultimately bound to stifle research every bit as much as has the DSM. Significant progress in understanding psychopathology, and ultimately treating and even preventing it, will be enhanced by encouraging theory development and theorydriven research from the bottom up, unconstrained by a priori assumptions about preferred levels of explanation, with the directions of future research determined not by a set of reified disorders, domains, or dimensions, but by the results of research and the development of new ideas and the constant revision of theories. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
